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LABOR LAW-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL H. SANDERS*
I. UNION MEMBERSHIP

II. FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
III. RIGHTS UNDER COLLECTIVE AGREEM[ENTS
IV. ARBITRATION

I. UNION

MEMERSHIP

In .considering basic rights in connection with labor organization, it
must be noted that there may be a fundamental conflict between
giving dominant emphasis to the interest of the group of organized
workers in advancing and maintaining the standards applicable to the
group as opposed to giving comparable emphasis to the wishes of the
individual employee of a particular employer. The various policy
statements contained in the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 indicate a public interest (within
the scope of federal authority) in the protection of employees' right
to organize, to choose their own representatives, to bargain collectively, and otherwise to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid
and protection.' At the same time, section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act makes clear that, in general, the basic right protected
by federal legislation is the uncoerced freedom of employees to make
a choice with regard to participation in employee organization and
engagement in concerted activities.2
This basic freedom of choice may be affected by an agreement
requiring union membership meeting the limitations and conditions
set forth in section 8 (a) 3 of the National Labor Relations Act.3 Section
14 (b) of this act, however, states that nothing in the act shall be
construed as authorizing agreements requiring labor union membership as a condition of employment in states forbidding the making
or application of such agreements. 4 It is under this latter provision
that state "right-to-work" statutes can be made applicable even to
those employers otherwise subject to the provisions of the NLRA.
Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-208 to 50-212, the Open Shop
*

Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

1. See particularly section 2 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffi), 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (a) -(c)
(Supp. II, 1959-61).

2. 49 Stat. 452 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
3. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 156(a)3 (1958).
4. 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
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Law, represent legislation in this state utilizing the congressional
permission implicit in section 14(b) of the NLRA. If a particular
employer's business does not affect commerce within the meaning of
the federal law, or is in that area where the National Labor Relations
Board has declined to assert jurisdiction, then the state statute is
independently applicable.5 Section 50-208 embodies a basic freedom
of choice in the employee with regard to the matter of affiliation or
non-affiliation with a labor organization. This section, however, purports to deal only with this freedom of choice insofar as it prohibits
the denial of employment because of the exercise of the choice.
Two decisions of Tennessee appellate courts during the survey
period involve oblique application of the provisions of the Tennessee
Open Shop Law. Neither of these decisions involves the utilization of
section 50-212 of the act which sets forth the penalty for the violation
of its various sections. There has been no reported appellate decision,
in fact, showing a utilization of the only remedy which the act contains, namely the criminal penalty in section 50-212. The current cases
and those mentioned in preceding surveys demonstrate that the courts
of the state have relied upon the policy of the statute in fashioning
other remedies against labor organization activity deemed contrary
to the spirit of the act In other words, the statute has been hospitably
received in this respect and expanded in its application beyond the
literal area covered by the enacted legislation. There are no reported
applications of the act insofar as it protects the worker's right to be a
member of or join a labor union.
In Large v. Dick7 the action of the trial judge in sustaining demurrers to declarations setting forth a common law tort action for damages was reversed and remanded. There were two separate declarations, each alleging the same facts. It was alleged that the plaintiff
had been employed by a contractor to paint a restaurant in Oak Ridge;
that while thus engaged, defendant local union and its business agent
conspired "maliciously and intentionally to injure plaintiff in his
trade" demanding that he be discharged because he was non-union,
accompanying the demand with the threat that if he was not discharged immediately a union picket line would be set up around the
restaurant. The declaration further averred that in consequence of
the threat plaintiff was discharged and has since been unable to work
at his trade. Other averments in the declaration undertaking to state
a cause of action for violation of the right-to-work statute and the
statute8 forbidding the procurement of breach of contract were elimi5. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) 1(2) (1958).
6. See Sanders & Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation-1959

Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. Rzv. 1231, 1239-40 (1959).
7. 343 S.W.2d 693 (Tenn. 1960).

8. TENN. CODE

ANN. § 47-1706 (1956).
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nated by amendment.
Judge Felts' opinion for the Supreme Court of Tennessee concluded
that the allegations made by the plaintiff, if taken as true, stated a
case against the defendants for intentional infliction of damage which
was actionable if done without privilege or legal justification. The
opinion, particularly on the petition to rehear, made it clear that the
decision is not based upon a violation of the right-to-work statute but
on the common law principle that "the intentional infliction of temporal damages is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive
law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if
the defendant is to escape."9 It was explained further that the defendants could not establish justification for the infliction of damage by
showing that it was their purpose to advance their interest as union
men, as well as to deny the plaintiff the right to work because he was
non-union. The court -treated as authoritative the many cases at
common law which hold that a labor union has no right to picket or
boycott or threaten such action for the purpose of compelling an employer to discharge an employee unless he becomes a member of the
union. The court cited approvingly a 1940 text treatment which declared it to be settled law that non-union employees discharged by
reason of the execution of a closed shop contract have a right of action
against the union for interfering with their right of employment. 10
The opinion recognized that in many states the efforts of a labor organization to secure an all-union shop are legal and that in such states
the organization will be privileged or justified in asserting its combined power to secure the discharge of a non-union man." The opinion
declared, however, that it could not be thought that action directed to
such an end could be recognized as privileged or justified in a state
such as Tennessee which hag an open shop or right-to-work law. The
portion of the opinion on the petition to rehear made it clear, however,
that this reference to the Tennessee right-to-work statute involved
no direct application of that statute but simply made reference to it
in determining the common law of the state as to the justification for
the particular conduct.
The principle enunciated and applied in this case is what is known
as the prima facie tort doctrine, first articulated in England in 1889
and 1892 in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.12 In this
case the defendant shipowners had combined for the purpose of securing control of the carriage of goods between England and certain
9. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) (Holmes, J.), quoted at 343
S.W.2d at 694.
10. 1 TELLER, LABOR DispuTEs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 46, at 112 (1940).
11. The court cites PROSSER, TORTS 743(2d ed. 1955).
12. [18891 23 Q.B. 598 (C.A.), aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25.
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Chinese ports. The defendants utilized methods such as rebates and
refusals to carry goods in an effort to bar any outside shipping company from access to the trade. The plaintiff's new transport line went
bankrupt as a result of the defendants' methods. The court held that
while the combination had intentionally ruined the new company,
there was justification in the defendants' right "to carry on their own
trade freely in the mode and manner that best suits them, and which
they think best calculated to secure their own advantage."' 3 Thus the
opinion, while enunciating the principle that the intentional infliction
of harm is actionable unless justified, found justification in the advancement of self-interest by the defendant shipowners.
The application of the Mogul Steamship principle to the efforts of
organized labor was first suggested by Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting
in the Massachusetts case of Vegelahn v. Guntner.14 He felt that the
policy of allowing free competition justified "the intentional inflicting
of temporal damage, including the damage of interference with a
man's business by some means, when the damage is done, not for its
own sake, but as an instrumentality in reaching the end of victory in
the battle of trade."' 5 It is clear that he felt that this principle applied
to the competition between the organized and the unorganized for
available work. While this point of view was undoubtedly adopted
as expressing the common law in many states 16 and was approved by
the American Law Institute in its Restatement of Torts, 7 it is obviously incompatible with the underlying policy of the right-to-work
statute, as the court found in this case.
In Martin v. Dealers Transport Co. 18 a bill for an injunction had
been filed by representatives of a class consisting of Tennessee employees of the defendant automobile transport company. The bill
sought to prevent the enforcement of a union shop agreement between
defendant company and defendant local union at Louisville, Kentucky.
It was conceded that the agreement in question was legal and could
be enforced in Kentucky since it has no right-to-work law, but it
was contended that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable in
Tennessee, by reason of the policy in the right-to-work statute. The
chancellor found that the agreement in question did violate the public
policy of the state of Tennessee, and enjoinqd its application to the
class of employees represented by the plaintiffs. The opinion of Judge
Bejach in the court of appeals dealt primarily with issues relating to
13. [18893 23 Q.B. 598, 613 (C.A.).

14. 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
15. Id. at 1081.
16. See cases cited in PROSSER, TORTS 743 (2d ed. 1955).
17. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 775, 788, 810 (1939).
18. 342 S.W.2d 245 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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whether or not the state court had jurisdiction in such a matter and
whether or not the chancellor erred in ruling that the agreement in
question violates the law and public policy of Tennessee.
The opinion rejected the contention of the appellant union that in
the above situation exclusive jurisdiction was in the National Labor
Relations Board. The opinion disposed of this complicated topic of
pre-emption by citing the 1949 case of Colgate-Palmolive-PeetCo. v.
NLRB. 19 There, in the review of a board order in an unfair labor practice proceeding involving the carrying out of a closed shop agreement
(legal under the Wagner Act), the United States Supreme Court
had held that the NLRB has no authority to convert into an unfair
labor practice that which was expressly authorized by Congress. The
Tennessee court's reasoning on this point is summed up in the following statement: "If the National Labor Relations Board did not have
jurisdiction to declare something unfair labor practice under the
terms of a closed shop contract, it seems obvious to us it would be
similarly without authority under a union shop contract such as is
involved in the instant case." 20 The inadequacy of this reasoning in
light of the numerous developments relating to pre-emption since
1949 will not be discussed in detail. 2 ' On the other hand, it would
likely be concluded that the pre-emption doctrine would be inapplicable if the situation were analyzed under the principles controlling
pre-emption. The court very properly pointed out that the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Railway Employees v. Hanson2 2 involves a specific authorization under the Railway Labor Act,2
as amended in 1951, which is completely different from the provision
in the National Labor Relations Act on the matter of union shop agreements and state law.
A second phase of this case presents a much more difficult problem.
The court rejected the contention of the local labor union which had
made the agreement with the company in Louisville to the effect that
since the agreement was valid and enforceable in Kentucky where it
was made, it should be given full faith and credit and enforced in
Tennessee. The court declared that this was a situation where the
law of the forum prevails over the law of the place of contracting.24
The court cited previous decisions where the Tennessee court has
refused to enforce in Tennessee obligations- which were legal in the
19. 338 U.S. 355 (1949).
20. 342 S.W.2d at 248.

21. See discussions of the pre-emption problem and the factors which must
be looked into in the survey articles at 10 VANI. L. REv. 1110 (1957), 11 VAND.
L.REv. 1287 (1958), 12 VAND. L.REv.1231 (1959), 13 VANM. L.Rv.1159 (1960).
22. Railway Employees'Dept.v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
23. 62 Stat. 909 (1951); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
24. The court quoted 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 16 (1939).
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state where they were made but which were considered as contrary
to the public policy of the state of Tennessee. The court also stated
that there is no merit in the contention that the injunction in this
case interferes with the free flow of commerce between the states. It
accepted the testimony of one of the complaining employees that interstate commerce would be expedited by such an injunction because
shipments would reach their destination while the Louisville driver
sleeps.
This decision presents great difficulties in analysis because of the
absence of information as to a number of pertinent facts. The statement of facts does not indicate precisely what the class of employees
is that is represented by the plaintiffs; there is nothing to indicate
precisely where the plaintiffs were hired, where job assignments
were given and where the duties of the complainants began or ended;
there is nothing to indicate the precise relationship of the plaintiffs to
the state of Tennessee, that is, whether it was a matter of residence
only, or assignment or place of work only, or some undefined combination. The underlying problem is obviously one which could present a
great deal of difficulty and the solution of it is by no means clear when
the applicable provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are
examined. There is the added factor of a person being engaged in
work involving the crossing of state lines. Employment and job
assignment in Tennessee are subject to the Tennessee statutory policy.
If neither of these phases take place within the state there would
appear to be nothing upon which the policy could operate. Ultimately,
a federal question would be presented calling for decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
II.

FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

Title 3 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 authorizes
certain suits in United States district courts by and against labor
organizations and makes special provisions for venue and the service
of legal process. Section 301 authorizes the institution of such suits
by and against labor organizations for the violation of contracts between an employer and the collective bargaining agent. Section 303
of this act makes unlawful a variety of boycotts and other unlawful
combinations (the same as those forbidden as union unfair labor
practices under section 8 (b) 4 of the National Labor Relations Act)
and authorizes damage suits in the United States district court for
those injured in their business or property by reason of the forbidden
conduct. The effect of these special provisions and limitations with
respect to amount in controversy, jurisdiction, venue, and service of
process is made apparent in a case such as Stein v. American Federa-
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tion of Musicians5 where the jurisdictional basis of the federal court
suit was diversity of citizenship. The question presented in the case
was whether the American Federation of Musicians should be regarded as an entity comparable to a corporation for purposes of
federal court diversity jurisdiction. Judge Miller's opinion declared
that the union is not to be treated like a corporation with respect to
residence, but rather is to be treated as a voluntary, unincorporated
association, resident wherever it has members. Since this includes
Tennessee, there was not complete diversity between the plaintiff and
the defendants and therefore the required basis of federal jurisdiction
was absent.
Two decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit during the survey period involve damage suits against labor
organizations pursuant to section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. In each case the reviewing court found that unlawful secondary pressure had occurred and sustained judgments for substantial
items of damage attributable to such conduct.
In United Mine Workers v. Osborne Mining Co.,26 the suit had been
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee by a Kentucky corporation. The plaintiff's theory was that
the defendants had induced and encouraged employees of neutral
employers to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to mine and transport coal, all for the purpose of forcing
the plaintiff to recognize the UMWA as a representative of plaintiff's
employees, the UMWA not having been certified as such representative under the National Labor Relations Act. There was also a claim
based on violation of the common law of Tennessee. The district court,
after a lengthy hearing, had adopted 124 findings of fact and 14 conclusions of law and rendered judgments for the plaintiff mining
company in the amount of $165,000 compensatory damages and $50,000
punitive damages. The court of appeals affirmed the action of the
district court as against the appeal of the union regarding the proof
of unlawful secondary pressure, and also as against the appeal of the
mining company regarding the adequacy of the damages which had
been granted.
The case in question grew out of events taking place at Jellico, Tennessee in 1954 and 1956, particularly in and around the Osborne
Mining Company's tipple at Jellico. The opinion of Circuit Judge
Weick in this case stated that the facts as found by the district judge
"present a frightening picture of violence and intimidation." He selected for reference mention of incidents involving the prevention of
25. 183 F. Supp. 99 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
26. 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1960).
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trucks from unloading coal at Osborne's tipple, including an incident
in August, 1954, when trucks of coal entering Jellico were stopped by
groups of men in the streets and the drivers were arrested by a
deputy sheriff who was a member of the union. This was done on
warrants charging operation of trucks with improper equipment and
without a Tennessee license. The opinion of the court of appeals found
no basis for interfering with the district judge's findings of fact. He
found that the acts of violence and intimidation were intended to and
that they had created a reign of terror in the Jellico area in order to
promote the UMWA's organizing campaign. In addition, he found
that such acts were intended to and did induce and encourage employees of employers other than Osborne to engage in a concerted
refusal to mine and haul the coal, the objective being to force Osborne
to bargain with the UMWA as the representative of its employees.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in approving the judgment against the union in this case, distinguished NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 27 where it had been held that a secondary
boycott had not occurred when the union pickets threw rocks at a
truck driver who sought to approach the premises which were the
site of the primary dispute. The court of appeals stated that the
activities of the defendants in this case were not directed against a
single neutral party, but against many neutral employers and their
employees. The court declared that while Osborne had two employees
at the tipple, most of its employees were in its strip mines and that
the situs of the dispute was the pit where the miners were working
and not the tipple. In any event, the court accepted the trial court's
determination that the UMWA had not confined activities to the tipple
or any picket line at the tipple, but that they were spread throughout
the area. The opinion stated that even in picketing at the premises
of a primary employer, the union must exercise its rights consistent
with the right of neutral employers to remain uninvolved in the dispute. The court of appeals reached the general conclusion that none
of the findings of fact of the trial court were so clearly erroneous as
to permit it to set them aside.
With respect to the issue as to whether the truck drivers or the
sublessee mine operators were neutral employees within the meaning
of the act (Osborne being the lessor of the properties in question) the
court indicated that this is essentially a question of fact rather than
law and that the trial court had found that Osborne did not control
either the secondary employers or their employees. The opinion declared that prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 the employees of the lessee mine operators and the truckers would have
27. 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
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been considered as employees of Osborne, but in this instance the
evidence supported the findings of the, trial judge as to the existence
of the independent contractor relationship. The court declared further
that the activities of the UMWA were directed against both, primary
and secondary employers and employees, but that this did not oust
the federal court of jurisdiction. The rationale was that the acts were
so interrelated as to be virtually impossible to separate and the federal district court had jurisdiction to consider and determine a claim
based upon a violation of the common law of Tennessee, since the
claim was joined with the federal claim and supported by the same
evidence. 28 The opinion drew the conclusion that there was support
for holding the defendant labor organizations responsible under the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior for the acts of their
agents and servants and that section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 29
did not immunize unions from the activities shown here. The opinion
reversed the judgment in favor of Love & Amos, a sales agency for
Osborne. The court concluded that the damage to the sales agency
was too incidental and remote for recovery under section 303 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act and that if Love & Amos were damaged as a result of any activities of the defendants directed at it, an
adequate remedy would exist under state law.
In Local 984, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. HumKo
Co., ° the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found
adequate support for the findings and conclusions reached in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western
Division, with the exception of the allowance of attorneys fees as
items of damage. The appeal was from three judgments which had
been entered by the district court. One judgment had been recovered
by the HumKo Company, with which the defendant union had a dispute at Memphis, Tennessee. Another judgment was recovered by a
mechanical contracting firm in Memphis which had undertaken the
construction of a refinery for HumKo at Champaign, Illinois. A third
judgment had been recovered by the Kuhne-Simmons Company, Inc.,
a company which had been engaged in the construction of the facility
at Champaign.
The dispute between HumKo, Inc., and the defendant labor organization occurred in connection with the negotiation of a new collective
bargaining agreement covering employees at the company's Memphis
plant in mid-1957. Certain members of the local in Memphis, together
28. Citing Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933)

and United Mine Workers

v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013
(1959).
29. 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1958).
30. 287 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1961).
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with an officer and agent, went to Champaign and formed a picket line
at the site of the HumKo facility there which was in process of construction. The construction work was halted for a period of two weeks
as a result of this picketing and the suit in this case was concerned
with the damages that were said to have resulted. The opinion sets
forth an extensive summary of the findings of fact and the conclusions
of law entered by the district court in this case. The opinion contains
a sample of some of the findings and the testimony upon which the
finding was based, and then concludes that its examination of all the
evidence left the court with a definite and firm conviction that no
mistake had been committed; that there was substantial evidence to
support the findings of the trial judge; and that the object or purpose
of the picket line at the refinery in Champaign was to stop construction work on the refinery and that this object was achieved as a result
of the picketing operation. The court stated further that there was substantial evidence to support the finding that when the union officials
at Memphis sent union members from Memphis to Champaign, they
had secondary picketing as an object; that there was neither intention
nor effort to assert pressure upon the salaried, supervisory and engineering employees of HumKo at Champaign; that since the plant at
Champaign was not in production there could not have been any lawful primary picketing at this plant. The court rejects the idea that the
international union (one of the appellants) did not participate in,
authorize or ratify the conduct of the local or the agents and members
of the local. The court found that the participation of the international
representative in this instance in the Memphis negotiations, his actual
notice of what was going on at Champaign and his actual knowledge
of a complaint filed with the NLRB by a neutral employer at Champaign all indicated participation, authorization and ratification by the
international union. The court of appeals did not find any of the items
of damage assessed against the defendant labor organization to be excessive or not supported by evidence, with the exception of an item
relating to attorneys fees.
In Phillips v. Local 662, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers,31 the regional director of the NLRB was seeking an injunction against the defendant union because of alleged violations of sections 8(b)4(i) and (ii)B, as required under the Taft-Hartley Act.
Members of the defendant union had been employed by a radio station
in Chattanooga prior to the purchase of the station's facilities by a
new company. The new company had terminated the employment
of the union members and hired non-union employees. The respondent
labor organization had picketed the main offices and studios of the
31. 192 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Tenn. 1960).
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station in the Patten Hotel, picketed a mobile unit of the station at
certain street locations in Chattanooga, and mailed out a large number
of notices containing a list of business concerns which were continuing
to place advertising over the "struck" radio station, with the statement
that such concerns "do not merit your patronage and support." The
list was mailed to the business concerns mentioned in the notice and
to other businesses, one of which had written on the margin, "We
would rather not add you to the list." Chief Judge Darr of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District, Southern Division,
awarded a temporary injunction against the defendant labor organization, with an indication that the mailing of the notice went further
than persuasion and encroached upon the freedom of neutral persons
to operate their business without undue pressure.
The opinion went on to state that the mobile "unit'of the radio station was primarily used in advertising business establishments by
parking it in front of the establishment and arranging a telephone
connection with the studio. The opinion of Chief Judge Darr declared
that the mobile unit would not be a substitute for the studio and office
headquarters of the station and that the picketing of it would constitute illegal pressure upon neutral persons. He pointed out that the
picketing at the Patten Hotel, which is concededly allowable under the
circumstances of this case, will afford the union adequate opportunity
to inform the public of the area of its claims.
Two comments may be made about the case. The mailing of the
notices to the advertisers and the pressure placed upon such business
concerns would not have been unfair labor practices subject to this
temporary injunction proceeding prior to the Landrum-Griffin amendments to the National Labor Relations Act in 1959. Under the wording
as it existed prior to 1959, the forbidden pressure had to involve inducing the employees of an employer to engage in a concerted refusal
of activity where an object was to force the cessation of business with
another person. Under the 1959 amendment, however, section 8 (b) 4(ii) B forbids a labor organization to threaten, coerce or restrain any
person where an object is the forcing or requiring of any person to
cease doing business with any other person. Under section 8 (b) 4 (i) B,
if the pressure is applied to "any individual employed by any person"
for the proscribed object set forth above, it is only necessary to show
that such individual was induced or encouraged in order to make out
a violation. The head of a business concern would not be treated as
an "individual employed by any person." Apparently in this case the
judge considered that the mailing of the notice to the advertisers was
coercive, with an object of securing a withdrawal of business from the
struck station.
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With regard to the picketing of the mobile unit, the court was
applying what is known as the "Washington Coca-Cola doctrine."
The general effect of this doctrine is that picketing should be restricted
to the principal place of business of an employer with whom there is
a primary dispute if there is adequate opportunity at that location.
Where this is true, the picketing of locations other than a principal
place of business, such as at a truck making delivery at a customer's
place of business, amounts to prohibited secondary pressure. There
is some question as to the continuing validity of this doctrine in light
of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
General Electric "reserved gate" case32 In this decision in May, 1961,
the Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's doctrine that it would constitute prohibited secondary pressure for a union to picket a gate reserved solely for the employees of independent contractors at the
plant of the employer with whom the union had a primary dispute.
The opinion makes clear, however, that to the extent that any of the
contractors were performing work of a sort that would normally be
performed by the company's production and maintenance employees,
the picketing could continue; that is, that it would not be forbidden
secondary pressure. If the logic of this idea of permitting picketing
wherever work is being performed associated with the employer's
normal operations is carried out, it might very well result in a finding
that the picketing of a mobile radio unit was primary rather than
secondary.
In NLRB v. Lassing,:- the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
denied enforcement to a Board order. The Board had found that the
respondent employer had violated sections 8 (a) 1 and 8 (a) 3 of the
National Labor Relations Act by discharging three employees because
they had joined the union, and had violated sections 8 (a) 1 and 8 (a) 5
by refusing thereafter to bargain with the union.34 In the per curiam
decision denying enforcement of the Board's order, it was stated that
the respondent had considered the matter of continuing to truck gas
with its own equipment and employees. It had, however, decided to
adopt a common carrier system of gas delivery as soon as anything
occurred which would increase costs, and in any event when the truck
licenses expired in 1959. In January of 1959, respondent's drivers
joined the union. When a negotiating conference was requested, the
drivers were informed that the decision had been made to contract
with a common carrier and that they were being terminated. The
opinion goes on to state that the company had refused the requested
32. Local 761, Internat'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 81 S.Ct. 1285
(1961).
33. 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960).
34. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
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recognition by the union because the coming of the union was the
"added expense" which brought to fruition its planned abandonment
of its previous method of shipping.
The court referred to its previous decisions in NLRB v. Adkins
Transfer Co.3 and NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co., in which it had held
that a company may suspend operations or change its method of
doing business with resulting loss of employment so long as the change
is motivated by financial or economic reasons, rather than the avoidance of obligations under the National Labor Relations Act. The court
of appeals rejected the NLRB's contention that this case is distinguishable from the above cases because the company accelerated its proposed change upon learning that its three employees had joined the
union before demands for increased pay had been made. It stated
that the company was justified in believing that such demands would
be made and could not be met.
The advent of the Union was a new economic factor which necessarily
had to be evaluated by the respondent as a part of the overall picture pertaining to costs of operation. It is completely unrealistic in the field of
business to say that management is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably in
changing its method of operations based on reasonably anticipated increased costs, instead of waiting until such increased costs actually materialize.37

III. RIGHTS UNDER COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
In Cameron v. J. C. Lawrence Leather Co.3 8 a discharged worker
brought suit in a Tennessee circuit court to recover for breach of the
collective agreement between the defendant employer and a labor
organization. The court of appeals, in the opinion by Presiding Judge
McAmis, affirmed the judgment below dismissing the suit. The opinion
states that the plaintiff had been discharged on the basis of medical
findings that a congenital anomaly in his back predisposed him to
accidental injury while performing the duties regularly assigned to
him. The plaintiff had been in the defendant's employ for several
years and the above physical condition was not discovered by the
defendant until the plaintiff was re-examined upon being recalled to
work following a layoff.
The court's opinion states that the weight of the proof is that the
plaintiff's back condition was permanent and that competent physicians had indicated to the defendant that it would be dangerous for
the employee to continue in the type of work he performed. The court
35. 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955).

36. 269 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1959).
37. 284 F.2d at 783.
38. 342 S.W.2d 65 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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stated that it is convinced that the defendant acted in good faith and
upon the basis of medical findings. The court indicated that the question is thus presented whether the employer was within his rights
under the collective agreement in acting as he did. Reference is made
to the Management Rights Clause of the collective agreement, which
refers to the right to "discharge for just cause" and also to another
section which refers to the same right as existing in the company. It
was pointed out that there is no express provision in the agreement
referring to the right of the employer to discharge an employee because of physical disability. The opinion seems to accept the proposition that the power to discharge for just cause refers to disciplinary
discharges rather than discharges based upon disability. It then asserted that this right of the employer to discharge for physical incapacity to perform substantially the contract was not to be taken as excluding whatever rights exist under the law and under a proper
construction of the contract. The opinion indicates that the general
authority reserved in the Management Rights Clause relating to management of the plant and direction of the working force (apart from
the reference to discharge) gives the authority to discharge under the
circumstances of this case.
It should be noted that the whole basis of the court's opinion would
be changed in this case if it would frankly recognize that the plaintiff's physical condition could provide "just cause" for the discharge.
It would appear to be much sounder to adopt this rationale than to
utilize the very general language relating to management of the plant
and direction of the working forces. The contract had specific language relating to discharge as well as a requirement that just cause
exist. The contract language itself imported no limitation as to the
nature of the just cause. If the contract had specific language dealing
with the problem, one would assume that the parties to the agreement
expected that language to be utilized rather than implications which
do not appear on the face of the contract. The writer believes that the
result would be the same as that reached in this case if the facts as
found by the court are to be taken as true.
The third appeal in Textile Workers Union v. Brookside Mills, Inc.39
was reported during the survey period. This case was concerned with
the computation of vacation payments to employees of a firm which
went out of business. The defendant had denied claims for vacation
pay by those employees who had been laid off for thirty days or more,
it being asserted that this broke the continuity of service required by
the collective bargaining agreement under which the vacation payments were provided. The opinion by Presiding Judge McAmis
39. 341 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
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rejected the defendant's contentions and affirmed the chancellor's construction of the term "continuous service." The court of appeals refused to find that the chancellor erred in accepting testimony in regard
to defendant's policy with respect to disregarding layoffs for economic
reasons. In a previous decision in this case, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee had declared that where a layoff was for a substantial period of time and for bona fide economic reasons, it would effect a
break in continuity of service, but that a brief and insubstantial layoff
ought not to be treated as an interruption of service. The court in
this case stated that the supreme court had not -been attempting to
lay down an absolute rule applicable under all circumstances regardless of how the parties themselves had construed the contract, which
would control the decision on the remand. The opinion seems to be
suggesting that the evidence of classification of employees as revealed
by the defendant's own records could properly have been treated as
determinative of the category of a particular employee for purposes
of ascertaining that employee's amount of vacation pay.
In Aluminum Co. of America v. Walker4 0 suit was filed by five employees of the defendant company for unemployment compensation
benefits which had been disallowed by the board of review because of
the refusal of these employees to accept jobs offered to them. The
chancellor held that the jobs offered were not suitable within the
meaning of the Tennessee Employment Security Law, and the company appealed on the ground that there was material evidence to support the conclusion of the board of review. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee, in an opinion by Justice Tomlinson, reversed the decree
of the chancellor, and restored the order of the board of review except
with respect to a portion of one claim.
The plaintiffs in this case had both been employed by the company
a number of years previously as laborers. Three of the plaintiffs
had progressed in their respective departments to the classification of
first class electrician, one to the classification of battery attendant,
and a fifth to truck repairman. At the time of the layoff for lack of
work, each of the plaintiffs was offered the next best available job in
the employer's plant for which he was qualified, which was that of
"laborer" or its equivalent. The compensation level for the offered
job was approximately $80 per week, which was $30 to $50 less than
the jobs from which plaintiffs had been laid off.
Under the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the plant,
there was a provision dealing with the recall of employees who had
been laid off for lack of work, reading as follows: "If an employee is
unemployed at the time of his recall, he is eligible for recall. in his own
40. 340 S.W.2d 898 (Tenn. 1960).
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job classification in any department of the Company on the basis of
his seniority. If a laid off employee accepts work in a department
other than his own he is eligible for recall to his own job classification,
on the basis of seniority, only in his own department."'41 The court
interpreted this provision as meaning that, for example, so long as an
electrician remained idle he had a chance of being recalled as an electrician in any department where such a job became open. The court
went on to say that, under the above-quoted provisions, if any of the
plaintiffs had accepted the job of laborer offered to him, he would not
have been eligible for recall to a job in his own classification in any
department except the department in which he was working at the
time he was laid off.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had refused the jobs as
laborers because of the disadvantages which would be placed upon
them under the quoted provision of the collective agreement. The
opinion referred to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1324, relating
to the determination of whether work offered is suitable, and concluded that in this case material evidence supported the board of
review's finding that the work offered was "suitable." The court's
opinion declared that even though it might be assumed that the
plaintiffs' refusal was for good cause, there still remained the question as to whether there was support in the record for the board's finding that the men failed "without good cause" to accept the work
offered, as this statutory term is used within the spirit and intent of
the Employment Security Law. The opinion states: "It may be that
these men exercised good judgment in refusing the next best available job on the chance that there might be made available in the reasonably near future a job of their old classification in some department of their employer. Under the evidence and plight of this case,
however, this was not a risk which must be charged to the official
'42
unemployment funds.

IV.

ARBITRATION

Efforts to enforce and to declare void a particular arbitration award
resulted in decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
and by the Supreme Court of Tennessee during the survey period.
A three-man board of arbitration, considering a grievance filed on
behalf of a dock loader who had been discharged for sleeping on the
job, had sustained the grievance of the discharged employee. The
award then provided that the aggrieved employee was to be reinstated
41. 340 S.W.2d at 900.

42. Id. at 902. See Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment Insurance,
8 VAND. L. REv.307, 323, 322 (1955).
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to his former position with no loss of seniority rights but with loss
of pay from the time of his discharge until the date of his employment.
The award went on to state that the grievant was derelict in his
duty in leaving his post, getting into an automobile and falling asleep,
but that the decision on the grievance should take into consideration
the surrounding circumstances and the manner in which the company
had handled the grievance. The labor organization involved in this
case filed suits in the United States district court under section 301
of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 to enforce the decision
of the board of arbitration. The defendant company- moved to dismiss
on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because no federal
question was involved. The district court felt that the motion to dismiss was well-taken because of the absence of a federal question,
citing Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.43 In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. Delta Refining Co.,44 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Pope, remanded the case with
directions to permit the appellant union to amend its complaint, if it
could do so, to show that there was an appropriate federal question in
spite of the Westinghouse decision. The court stated that it cannot
be said categorically that the action to enforce the arbitration award
is foreclosed as a "uniquely personal right" of an employee under the
Westinghouse rule. The court went on to say, "The mere fact that an
arbitration award may result in payment of back pay to an employee,
or his reinstatement after discharge, does not, in and of itself, bring
the case within the Westinghouse rule. An award of that character
may be the necessary end result of an action under Sec. 301 (a) to
vindicate the Union's rights under a collective bargaining agreement. '45 In spite of the decisions indicating that an award similar to
the one here could be enforced in federal court, the opinion concluded
that the motion to dismiss was proper in the light of the state of the
pleadings before the trial court. The court declared that the complaint
was inadequate even under the liberal rules to show that an appropriate case for relief was made out.
Overall v. Delta Refining Co.,46 involved the same arbitration award.
The proceeding in this instance was instituted by the company in
state court against the discharged employee and his union to have the
43. 348 U.S. 437 (1955). See the discussion of this case in Sanders & Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12
VAND. L. REV. 1231, 1241 (1959).

44. 277 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1960).
45. Id. at 696. The court cites its previous decisions to this effect, in Local

19, Warehouse Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776, 779, 781, (6th

Cir. 1956), A. L. Kornman Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 264 F.2d
733 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 819 (1959).
46. 340 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1960).
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arbitration award declared void. The basis of plaintiff's complaint was
that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority and compromised
the matter submitted to them. The chancellor sustained the employer's bill, and made a declaration setting aside the award.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in an opinion by Justice Swepston,
reversed the decree below, and rendered judgment declaring the
rights of the parties to be in accordance with the award of the arbitrators. The opinion sets forth in full text the grievance filed by
Overall in this case, the sections of the collective agreement relating
to arbitration, the powers of the arbitration committee, the section of
the agreement relating to the power of management to discharge for
proper cause, and excerpts from the award of the majority of the
board of arbitration. The court rejected the contention of the company that the award recognized that the discharge was made for
proper cause because it found that the aggrieved employee had been
derelict in his duty. It was pointed out that the award on its face
showed that the grievance should be sustained, which indicated that
the discharge was not for proper cause. The court then examined the
right of the arbitration committee to award reinstatement of an employee. The court agreed with counsel for the company that if the
arbitrators had in fact found that the discharge was for proper cause,
they could have gone no further and any attempt to award a lesser
penalty would have been plainly beyond their power and "absolutely
void." The court then stated:
Are we going to hold then that when the committee has found that the
discharge was not for proper cause, their award shall end at that point
with a period? That would hardly seem to be a rational solution of the
problem, or conduct consistent with the nature of an arbitration award.
That would leave the employee or the union in his behalf (whatever the
law may be in that regard we do not need to concern ourselves with at
this time) to commence a litigation for the purpose of reaping the benefit
of the award.47
The court quoted from other opinions relating to the power of arbitrators, and also quoted in full a section of American Jurisprudence
concerning the certainty of terms in the arbitration award. The court
concluded that the action taken by the majority of the arbitrators in
this instance was not inconsistent with the reserved powers of management under the collective agreement, in spite of the absence of an
express reference to reinstatement. The action of the arbitration committee, it is stated, did not amount to an altering of any provision of
the contract, but to the contrary, the committee did "a very sensible
thing."
47. Id. at 913.

